Key standards to know (and why they matter)
- MIL‑STD‑1916 — DoD’s preferred methods for acceptance of product; emphasizes prevention and process‑oriented controls (SPC) over legacy acceptance sampling. Taylor Enterprises sqconline.com
- MIL‑STD‑882E (w/ Change 1) — The DoD System Safety standard practice for identifying hazards and mitigating risk across the lifecycle (aligned with DoDI 5000 series). cto.mil Defense Acquisition University
- DFARS 252.246‑7007 — Contract clause requiring a Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System (traceability, screening, reporting). Also implemented in the eCFR. Acquisition.gov eCFR
Documented issues (with primary, authoritative sources)
- Counterfeit electronic parts in the DoD supply chain
- The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) published a formal report documenting the presence and risks of counterfeit electronic parts across defense programs. armed-services.senate.gov Congress.gov
- GAO investigations found that suspect counterfeit parts can be readily obtained and pose safety, mission, and readiness risks, driving DFARS and contractor system requirements. U.S. GAO+1 https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-12-375
- GAO 2016 follow‑up found DoD needed to improve reporting/oversight to reduce counterfeit risk — reinforcing the need for robust detection/avoidance systems. U.S. GAO
- Acceptance & process control gaps
- DoD guidance around MIL‑STD‑1916 explicitly pushes industry toward prevention‑based process control (SPC) rather than relying on lot sampling — a frequent maturity gap in supplier quality systems. (Companion handbook explains the shift and intent.) Defense Acquisition University sqconline.com
- System safety rigor
- MIL‑STD‑882E defines how programs must perform hazard analyses and risk acceptance; gaps in applying the current standard or carrying forward analyses through configuration changes are a common audit and readiness finding. cto.mil
Typical challenges (seen across primes, Tier1/2 suppliers)
- Traceability/control for electronics: Incomplete pedigree records, broker purchases, or weak screening allow suspect parts into assemblies; reporting/containment steps are unclear or inconsistent across sites. armed-services.senate.gov U.S. GAO
- Standards edition & flow‑down: Program docs (SOW, SQARs) cite different editions of MIL‑STDs/DFARS or omit DFARS counterfeit clauses, creating contractual ambiguity and audit exposure. eCFR
- Overreliance on end‑item inspection: Suppliers still lean on AQL/lot sampling instead of process controls encouraged by MIL‑STD‑1916, leading to variation escapes. sqconline.com
- Fragmented system‑safety work: Hazard analyses required by MIL‑STD‑882E aren’t continuously updated as designs/configurations change, weakening risk acceptance decisions. cto.mil
Best Practice playbook
- Implement and audit a DFARS‑compliant Counterfeit Parts system
- Build procedures around DFARS 252.246‑7007: approved supplier lists, traceability to original manufacturers/authorized distributors, authentication testing when pedigree is uncertain, and mandatory reporting (GIDEP, etc.). Use the eCFR text to ensure clause coverage and wording. eCFR
- Harden traceability & purchasing controls using GAO/SASC lessons
- Prohibit broker buys unless risk‑assessed; require full chain‑of‑custody documentation for electronics; verify C of C authenticity; conduct incoming inspection & test profiles aligned to risk (e.g., IDEA‑STD‑1010 methods where applicable). The SASC/GAO findings justify these controls in supplier flow‑down. armed-services.senate.gov U.S. GAO
- Adopt prevention‑based acceptance per MIL‑STD‑1916
- Replace pure acceptance sampling with SPC and process capability targets; formalize escape response (containment, root cause, error‑proofing) when process metrics trend out of control. Use the MIL‑HDBK‑1916 companion to structure plans and training. sqconline.com
- System Safety integration (MIL‑STD‑882E)
- Maintain a living hazard log; tie hazard analyses to configuration control (ECPs, waivers/deviations) so risk acceptance authority sees current data; verify contractor artifacts match 882E with Change 1. cto.mil
- Contracting & flow‑down hygiene
- Ensure solicitations, POs, and supplier quality clauses consistently reference the exact editions of MIL‑STDs and DFARS clauses (e.g., 252.246‑7007). Use ASSIST/DAU links to check for current revisions before release. Defense Acquisition University QuickSearch
Quick reference
- SASC Report (2012): Inquiry into counterfeit electronic parts in the DoD supply chain. armed-services.senate.gov Congress.gov
- GAO (2012): DOD Supply Chain: Suspect Counterfeit Electronic Parts Can Be Found on Internet Purchasing Platforms. U.S. GAO+1 https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-375.pdf
- GAO (2016): Counterfeit Parts—DOD Needs to Improve Reporting and Oversight. U.S. GAO
- DFARS 252.246‑7007 (eCFR): Counterfeit electronic part detection & avoidance system (current text). eCFR
- MIL‑STD‑1916 (acceptance of product) + MIL‑HDBK‑1916 (companion). Taylor Enterprises sqconline.com
- MIL‑STD‑882E (Change 1): DoD system safety standard practice (official). cto.mil